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COMMON GROUND IN THE SKY: EXTENDING THE 1967
OUTER SPACE TREATY TO RECONCILE U.S. AND
CHINESE SECURITY INTERESTS
Alex B. Englehart†
Abstract:
A storm is brewing 100 kilometers above the Pacific Rim. The early
21st century finds the People’s Republic of China in the throes of astronomical economic
growth, national development, and military expansion. The United States, meanwhile, is
staunchly determined to develop an effective missile defense system and to extend its
military capabilities in space as it pursues its global war on terrorism. China sees U.S.
military space activities as a threat and, along with Russia, has pushed hard in recent
years for a ban on all space weapons. So far, the United States has been unwilling to
negotiate on the subject, claiming that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty—which bans
weapons of mass destruction in space, but not other weapons—is sufficient. Pursuing
space weapons without coming to an understanding with the Chinese does not serve U.S.
national security interests. There is a better way.
Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty should be extended in a targeted manner
that will alleviate the worst of China’s worries—space-based kinetic kill vehicles and
lasers, and ground-based anti-satellite weapons—while at the same time leaving the
United States plenty of room to pursue its other military and strategic interests in space.
By following the examples set by UNCLOS III and the ABM and SALT treaties, China,
Russia, and the United States can amend Article IV in a way that will be acceptable to all
sides.

I.

INTRODUCTION

China’s recent test of an anti-satellite weapon on January 11, 2007,
put the incipient arms race in space between the United States and China
back into the public consciousness.1 Under the Bush Administration, the
United States has been aggressively pursuing offensive space weapons that
have the potential to seriously threaten China and upset the longstanding
geopolitical equilibrium based on mutually assured destruction.2 Russia and
others also fear the U.S. pursuit of space weapons,3 and these countries are
likely to rally to China as the arms race progresses. As the overall situation
continues to deteriorate, it is becoming increasingly clear that the unbridled
American pursuit of space weapons is a dangerous game and that the
consequences could be very severe indeed.
†
The author would like to thank Professor Veronica Taylor and the editors of the Pacific Rim Law
& Policy Journal for their support and encouragement.
1
William J. Broad & David E. Sanger, China Tests Anti-Satellite Weapons, Unnerving U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/18/world/asia/18cnd-china.html.
2
See id.
3
See Stephanie Nebehay, U.S. Blasts China Test, Sees “No Arms Race in Space”, REUTERS, Feb.
13, 2007, http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/L13267247.htm.
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The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”)4 is the major legal instrument
dealing with weapons in space.5 Originally, it concerned mainly the United
States and the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War—these were the
only countries with space programs at the time. But the treaty now has
ninety-one states-parties, including all members of the United Nations
Security Council.6 Article IV of the Treaty bans the stationing of all
weapons of mass destruction in space,7 but says nothing about the emerging
threats of kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and anti-satellite weapons.
This Comment examines the incipient arms race between the United
States and China and the current state of the Outer Space Treaty. It argues
that Article IV of the Treaty should be updated in order to deal with the new
types of weapons that form the backbone of this arms race. Part II provides
background on the current state of space weapons technology and the
dangerous geopolitical ramifications that are likely to result from the further
pursuit of that technology. Part III examines the Outer Space Treaty as it
currently exists and demonstrates that it is dangerously outdated. Part IV
argues that the international community should look to the principles that
guided it in developing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (“UNCLOS III”)8 for the law of the sea, as well as the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty (“ABM Treaty”) and other Cold War era arms control treaties,
and update the Outer Space Treaty accordingly.
II.

THE U.S. PURSUIT OF SPACE WEAPONS THREATENS CHINA AND DOES
NOT IMPROVE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

The development and deployment of space weapons will cost
enormous sums9 and ultimately lead to a much less safe and stable world.
Kinetic kill vehicles and space-based lasers are very complex devices that
4
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty].
5
Union of Concerned Scientists, International Legal Agreements Relevant to Space Weapons, Feb.
2004, http://www.ucsusa.org/global_security/space_weapons/international-legal-agreements-relevant-tospace-weapons.html.
6
U.S. Department of State, Outer Space Treaty, http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm (last visited
May 5, 2007).
7
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, art. IV.
8
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter
UNCLOS III].
9
Tim Weiner, Air Force Seeks Bush’s Approval for Space Weapons Programs, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/business/18space.html.
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have the potential to unleash enormous firepower on ground targets, but they
are themselves extremely vulnerable to relatively cheap and simple antisatellite weapons (“ASATs”).10 Moreover, the deployment of space weapons
and further development of ASATs will upset the longstanding strategic
logic of mutually assured destruction by significantly weakening the
effectiveness of intercontinental ballistic missiles (“ICBMs”) armed with
nuclear warheads.11 If the United States chooses to go the route of
aggressive space weapons development in spite of these dangers, it is sure to
further alienate the rest of the world—especially Russia—and drive it into
the arms of a welcoming China.12 In short, there are a number of very
serious long-term consequences to the development of space weapons that
the United States would be wise to consider before it is too late.
A.

A Number of Very Dangerous Space Weapons Are Being Developed

A variety of space weapons are currently being tested in preparation
for deployment over the next several years. These weapons generally fall
into one of two categories: kinetic kill vehicles and directed energy
weapons.13 Kinetic kill vehicles are conceptually straightforward—they are
simply solid objects designed to crash into their targets.14 Because of the
extreme velocities of objects traveling in orbit, no explosives are needed—
the force of the impact alone is enough to destroy almost any conceivable
target on the ground.15 The major difficulty is accurate targeting.16 Kinetic
kill vehicle launchers in orbit must be accurate to within several meters
while traveling at 4 kilometers per second at an altitude of tens of thousands
of kilometers—not an easy task.17 These weapons are also extremely
expensive to deploy.18
10

Zhang Hui, Space Weaponization and Space Security: A Chinese Perspective, CHINA SECURITY,
Spring 2006, at 24, 26-27, available at http://www.wsichina.org/attach/CS2_3.pdf. See also Phillip
Saunders et al., China’s Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons, CENTER FOR
NONPROLIFERATION
STUDIES
RESEARCH
STORIES,
Jul.
22,
2002,
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm.
11
See Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
12
See generally DMITRI TRENIN, RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY IN THE 21ST CENTURY ENVIRONMENT
11 (Institut français des relations internationals, Proliferation Papers, 2005),
available at
http://www.ifri.org/files/Securite_defense/prolif_12_Trenin.pdf.
13
See Hui, supra note 10, at 24-25.
14
See id.
15
Michael Goldfarb, The Rods from God, THE DAILY STANDARD, Jun. 8, 2005,
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/700oklkt.asp.
16
See id.
17
See id.
18
See Pegasus, ENCYCLOPEDIA ASTRONAUTICA, http://www.astronautix.com/lvs/pegasus.htm (last
visited May 5, 2007).
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One of the most widely discussed possibilities for the near future is
the so-called “rods from God.”19 These are tungsten rods twenty feet in
length and one foot in diameter that could hit a target anywhere on earth at
36,000 feet per second with about fifteen minutes notice.20 Such a weapon
would obviously be extraordinarily threatening to any potential adversary,
and there would be a huge incentive to develop methods of countering the
threat.21 In other words, there would be a new and terrifying arms race—
each country would feel the need to develop its own weapons program in
order not to be completely outmatched by its potential adversaries.22
Beyond kinetic kill vehicles, various forms of space-based lasers may
be being considered for deployment in the future.23 These could be used
mainly to counter enemy ICBMs and other small targets, rather than to
inflict nuclear-level destruction.24 They have the major benefit of being
reusable—after the laser apparatus is launched into orbit, it will function for
long periods of time without the need to replenish ammunition, as would be
required for kinetic kill vehicles. Additionally, they can hit their target
within a matter of seconds, as opposed to the delay of several minutes
involved with kinetic weapons.25 However, these types of lasers are at least
ten years away and many engineering problems remain to be solved before
they can become operational.26 The research and development of these
weapons will cost many billions of dollars.27
While space-based kinetic kill vehicles and lasers still remain to be
deployed, ground-based “ASATs” have been operational for quite some
time.28 These are specialized weapons that are launched from the ground
and designed to accurately hit a targeted satellite in orbit. The United States
has had them since the 1980s,29 and China successfully tested one in January
2007.30 They are much simpler and cheaper than the space-based weapons
they are designed to counter.31 And now that space-based weapons may
19

Goldfarb, supra note 15.
Id.
21
See generally Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
22
Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
23
See Steven Lambakis, Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics, 105 HOOVER INSTITUTION POL’Y
REV. 41 (2001), available at http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3479337.html.
24
See id.
25
Weiner, supra note 9.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Dwayne Day, Blunt Arrows: the Limited Utility of ASATs, SPACE REV., Jun. 6, 2005,
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/388/1.
29
Id.
30
See Broad & Sanger, supra note 1.
31
Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
20
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become operational, ASATs are naturally taking on a more important
strategic role.
B.

A U.S. Deployment of These Space Weapons Will Open the Door for
Other Countries to Do So in the Future

The United States appears to be increasingly determined to proceed
with the development and deployment of space weapons. Late in 2006,
President Bush signed a new National Space Policy that categorically rejects
all future legal limitations on space weapons and declared that the United
States has the right to deny access to space to those that are “hostile to U.S.
interests.”32 One of the President’s top priorities is to “enable unhindered
U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there.”33 This
sounds laudable, but in an interconnected world there are sure to be
dangerous consequences to the pursuit of entirely “unhindered” U.S.
operations in space. Specifically, other nations will also have a license to
pursue “unhindered” operations in space, presenting the United States with
grave military threats in the future.34 Even now, China sees the U.S.
operations as a direct threat and tensions between the two countries will
increase as the United States goes down this unilateral path.35 Ultimately,
the current policy of simply flouting the positions of other world powers will
come back to haunt the United States.
While the United States is the only country in the world with the
potential to deploy space weapons within the next two decades, China,
Russia, and others may have the capability later in the twenty-first century.36
Nothing lasts forever. The United States may be the dominant economic and
military power at this point in history, but China, at least, is catching up.
Current projections have China reaching economic parity with the United
States around 2050.37 As with the American development of nuclear
weapons in the twentieth century, a robust deployment of space weapons by
the United States will open up a Pandora’s box of unpredictable and
frightening consequences as the twenty-first century progresses.38 China,
32

Marc Kaufman, Bush Sets Defense as Space Priority, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2006, at A1.
Id.
34
See generally, Bill Gertz, Moscow, Beijing Eye Space Weapons, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2007, at
A06, available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070116-101320-7600r.htm.
35
See Hui, supra note10, at 24.
36
See John Pike, American Control of Outer Space in the Third Millennium, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/spp/eprint/space9811.htm (last visited May 5, 2007).
37
China
‘To
Dwarf
G7 States
by 2050’,
BBC NEWS,
Mar.
3,
2006,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4770590.stm.
38
See Hui, supra note 10, at 24.
33
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seething with resentment at the United States’ cavalier attitude on space
weapons earlier in the century, will be as determined as ever to develop its
own offensive space weapons as soon as it is able to. Russia and eventually
others are sure to follow. Ultimately, it may be better for no one to have
these weapons than for everyone to have them.
C.

If They Are Deployed, Space Weapons Will Be Inherently Vulnerable
to Attack by Much Cheaper and Simpler Weapons—a Strategically
Destabilizing Development

The ASATs that already exist are quite capable of destroying the
orbiting space-based weapons of the future.39 This is the fundamental
problem with the strategic logic behind the development of kinetic kill
vehicles and space-based lasers—they pack an amazing offensive punch, but
can be destroyed extremely easily.40 As long as both China and the United
States have ASATs only, there is strategic stability. If either country used
ASATs in anger against the other’s satellites, the other could retaliate in
kind.41 On the other hand, once space-based weapons are deployed, the
situation changes dramatically.42 As soon as a conflict begins, an adversary
equipped with ASATs would use them to destroy the enemy’s spaced-based
weapons (as well as other critical satellites).43 Therefore, in order to be
effective, space-based weapons would need to be used first, in a massive
surprise attack.44 This is extremely destabilizing logic.45 As tensions rise
between two countries, each would have a huge incentive to strike first—one
to use space-based weapons before they could be destroyed, the other to use
ASATs to destroy the space-based weapons before they could be used.46
Unlike the situation in the U.S.-Soviet Cold War of the twentieth century,
there is no guarantee of mutually assured destruction to prevent the onset of
conflict.47 Whoever strikes first gains an enormous advantage.
Given this reality, spaced-based weapons are not a wise investment.48
A robust deployment of kinetic kill vehicles alone would have costs in the

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

Id. at 26-27.
See generally Saunders et al., supra note 10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See generally RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR 399-441 (1973).
See Saunders et al., supra note 10.
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hundreds of billions of dollars,49 but these weapons could be neutralized by
ASATs costing several orders of magnitude less.50
Any country
contemplating extensive development of these weapons should take this into
account.51 Other weapon systems may very well cost less and be much more
effective in the long run.
While the United States, China, and perhaps Russia are the only
countries on earth with any likelihood of developing space-based weapons in
the first half of the twenty-first century,52 ASATs could easily find their way
into the hands of rogue states and even non-state actors. As noted, they are
orders of magnitude less expensive than space-based weapons and do not
require nearly the same level of technical expertise to deploy and use
effectively.53 A terrorist organization or rogue state could destroy American
satellites—including multi-billion dollar weapons systems—with ASATs
costing only a few million dollars. This threat from smaller adversaries is
another reason to forego the extreme expense and risk involved in full-scale
development and deployment of space-based weapons.
D.

An Effective U.S. Space Weapons Deployment Would Neutralize the
Effectiveness of ICBMs and Create a Powerful Incentive for Nuclear
Preemptive Strikes

In addition to the strategic interplay between space-based weapons
and ASATs discussed above,54 space-based weapons would have a major
impact on the effectiveness of ICBMs,55 the mainstay weapons of the second
half of the twentieth century. ICBMs armed with nuclear warheads have
been the primary guarantor of mutually assured destruction since their
inception in the 1960s—any use of ICBMs against another country also
equipped with them would lead to massive retaliation in kind.56 The threat
of mutual annihilation kept the peace between the superpowers during the
Cold War and has continued to preserve stability among powerful nations up
to the present day.57 Even in today’s so-called “uni-polar” world, Russia and
China maintain vast quantities of weapons of mass destruction that serve as

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Weiner, supra note 9.
See Hui, supra note 10, at 32.
See generally Saunders et al., supra note 10.
See Pike, supra note 36; Saunders et al, supra note 10.
See Saunders et al., supra note 10.
See supra Part II.B.
See Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 47 at 399-441.
See id.; Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
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a strong deterrent to any potential adversary considering an attack.58
Unfortunately, with the development of space-based weapons, especially
missile interceptors, this stability would be eviscerated.59 Space-based
interceptors would be accurate and fast enough to reliably shoot down
ICBMs in flight.60 If one country possessed space-based interceptors, it
would effectively neutralize the ICBMs of all other countries, allowing it to
use its own ICBMs with relative impunity.61
If the United States starts to deploy space-based interceptors that can
shoot down ICBMs, China will face enormous internal pressure to at least
consider the idea of launching a massive nuclear first strike.62 This is
because once a robust space-based interceptor system is deployed, the
United States would have essentially unlimited power to dictate terms to
China on any matter it chooses—China would be at the absolute mercy of
the United States.63 China would have a limited window of time in which to
use its ICBMs before they became worthless in the face of orbiting
interceptors, and it could very well feel compelled to do so in order to avoid
the total collapse of its strategic nuclear deterrent.64
E.

Beyond the Inevitable Direct Harm to Sino-American Relations, the
Deployment of Space Weapons Would Inflame Russia and Drive It into
a Closer Relationship with China

Even though Russia is now much weaker than the Soviet Union of the
Cold War era,65 it still has thousands of ICBMs,66 and the United States
should carefully consider the ramifications of its planned space weapons
deployment in light of that reality.67 Russia’s opinion cannot be ignored.68
While it may not be capable of effectively deploying space-based weapons
in the near to mid-term, it may well have an operational ASAT capability69
and, in any case, its ICBMs demand respect.70 Like China, Russia depends
58

See Hui, supra note 10, at 26; TRENIN, supra note 12, at 7.
See Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
60
Id.
61
See generally id.
62
See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 47 at 399-441.
63
See Hui, supra note 10, at 26.
64
See generally WEIGLEY, supra note 47 at 399-441.
65
See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 7.
66
Natural Resoures Defense Council, Table of USSR/Russian ICBM Forces, 1960-2002,
http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab4.asp (last visited May 5, 2007).
67
See Gertz, supra note 34.
68
See generally TRENIN, supra note 12.
69
See Gertz, supra note 34.
70
Id.
59
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on its ICBM capability to maintain its international respect. By being able
to threaten any potential adversary with nuclear annihilation, Russia
maintains its strength and independence in a changing world.71 Also like
China, Russia is understandably worried about the American pursuit of space
weapons, which have the potential to undermine the effectiveness of
ICBMs.72
Russia has long been a strategic player in the space weapons arena. In
the late 1970s, the United States and the Soviet Union entered into
negotiations on an ASAT ban, but the discussions fell apart before any
agreement was reached.73 Ever since, the Soviet Union (later Russia) has
been wary of American plans to deploy any kind of weapon in space or
further pursue ASAT capabilities.74 The Strategic Defense Initiative under
the Reagan administration—a predecessor to twenty-first century American
space weapons programs—arguably hastened the collapse of the Iron
Curtain.75 The actual deployment of satellite-based weapons in the coming
decades is sure to inflame Russia and drive it further away from the United
States.
If Russia moves away from the United States, it will move towards
China.76 Now that China has taken the geopolitical lead in opposing the
United States—particularly with respect to space weapons development77—a
disillusioned Russia is sure to find a strong ally in its neighbor to the east.78
In fact, it already has.79 In 2002, Russia and China jointly submitted a
working paper to the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty to completely
ban space weapons.80 The preamble to this proposed treaty states that “for
the benefit of mankind, outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and
it shall never be allowed to become a sphere of military confrontation.”81
71

Id.
Nina Tannenwald, Law Versus Power on the High Frontier: The Case for a Rule-Based Regime
for Outer Space, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 363, 369 (2004).
73
See Day, supra note 28.
74
See id.
75
See Ronald Hilton, The Collapse of the Soviet Union and Ronald Reagan,
http://wais.stanford.edu/History/history_ussrandreagan.htm (last visited May 5, 2007).
76
See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11.
77
Hui, supra note 11, at 24.
78
See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11.
79
See ARIEL COHEN, HERITAGE FOUND, THE RUSSIA-CHINA FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION
TREATY: A STRATEGIC SHIFT IN EURASIA? (2001), http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/
BG1459.cfm.
80
Conference on Disarmament Delegations of China and the Russian Federation, Possible Elements
for a Future International Legal Agreement on the Prevention of the Deployment of Weapons in Outer
Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (Joint Working Paper, 2002), available at
http://www.nti.org/db/china/engdocs/chnruss.htm.
81
Id.
72
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The basic obligations proposed include “[n]ot to place in orbit around the
Earth any objects carrying any kinds of weapons, not to install such weapons
on celestial bodies, or not to station such weapons in outer space in any other
manner” and “not to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space
objects.”82 This sweepingly broad language was too much for the United
States, and it declined to enter any kind of negotiations on the proposal.83
But even so, the proposal should serve as a strong warning to the United
States of the close alignment between China and Russia on the space
weapons issue.84 If the United States completely flouts the manifest wishes
of China and Russia on this issue, those two countries will be driven more
closely together—not just on space weapons, but generally.85 The United
States would be wise to consider the significant long-term consequences of
fortifying the Moscow-Beijing axis in this way.86
The combined
geopolitical—and specifically, military—might of these two nations would
pose a grave threat to U.S. interests all over the world.87 If a united Russia
and China decided to support Iran or North Korea, the United States would
be effectively blocked from pursuing its interests and security vis-à-vis those
states.88 As China inevitably becomes more powerful economically and
militarily, the United States must do its best to maintain good relations with
Russia and prevent it from moving completely into the Chinese camp.89
Showing a willingness to negotiate on the space weapons issue would serve
that goal well.
III.

THE OUTER SPACE TREATY IS DANGEROUSLY OUTDATED

The best hope for averting a major conflict over space weapons in the
future is a targeted updating of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. The goals set
forth in the preamble to the Treaty remain as valid today as they were forty
years ago, but technology has changed to such an extent that the body of the
Treaty is no longer capable of fulfilling those goals.

82

Id.
Eric M. Javits, U.S. Ambassador, Conference on Disarmament, Address at Conference on Future
Security in Space (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0205/doc17.htm.
84
See U.S. Clashes with China, Russia over Space Arms, MSNBC.COM, Feb. 13, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17129938/.
85
See Cohen, supra note 79.
86
See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11.
87
Id.
88
See generally An Iran-Russia-China Axis?, JANE’S INFO. GROUP, Oct. 27, 2005,
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jid/jid051027_1_n.shtml.
89
See generally TRENIN, supra note 12, at 11.
83
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The Preamble to the Outer Space Treaty—and the Noble Principles
Behind It—Are Still Valid

The Outer Space Treaty begins with a number of noble principles that
are as valid today as they were in 1967:
The States Parties to this Treaty,
Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a
result of mans entry into outer space,
Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress
of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be
carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the
degree of their economic or scientific development,
Desiring to contribute to broad international co-operation in the
scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use
of outer space for peaceful purposes,
Believing that such co-operation will contribute to the
development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening
of friendly relations between States and peoples90
As demonstrated by the renewed vigor of NASA91 and the rapid growth of
Chinese civilian space flight in the last decade,92 the principal signatory
nations are certainly still “inspired by the great prospects opening up before
mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space.”93
It also goes without saying that these nations continue to recognize
“the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and
use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”94 The exploration of space is
surely the long-term destiny of humanity, and on a general level, all nations
believe “that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for
the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or
90

Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, pmbl.
Press Release, The White House, President Bush Announces New Vision for Space Exploration
Program, (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/200401141.html.
92
Jim Banke, China Launches its First Piloted Spaceflight, SPACE.COM, Oct. 15, 2003,
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/shenzhou5_launch_031014.html.
93
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 4, pmbl.
94
Id.
91
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scientific development”95 and “desire to contribute to broad international
cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration
and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.”96 And the proposition “that
such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding
and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples” is
self-evident. All of these principles are as valid today as they were in 1967,
and the United States, China, and others should continue to look to them for
guidance as they consider revising the details of the treaty to keep up with
the changing technological landscape of the 21st century.
B.

Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty Has Not Kept Up with
Technology

The meat of the Outer Space Treaty was placed in Article IV: “States
Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such
weapons in outer space in any other manner.”97 This agreement on weapons
of mass destruction was a major accomplishment in 1967. At that time,
ICBMs were first being deployed and there was real fear that soon nuclear
weapons would be stationed in space.98 The United States and the Soviet
Union agreed that, even if stationing nuclear weapons in space were feasible,
such a development would be very dangerous for both sides and would
hamper the noble, peaceful uses of space that are outlined in the Treaty’s
preamble.99 A ban would be best for both sides and for humanity at large.100
In 1967, the stationing of nuclear weapons in orbit was the only
significant military threat that either side could envision in space.101 The
idea of precision-guided kinetic kill vehicles or laser weapons being
effectively used in space was science fiction at the time and thus did not
merit serious attention in the Treaty. But in 2007, these weapons are not
only conceivable, they are being actively pursued and some could become
operational within the next decade.102 While perhaps not as massively
destructive in their own right as actual nuclear weapons, these weapons have
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the potential to be just as damaging to world peace and to humanity’s future.
Kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs have the potential to
seriously disrupt the effectiveness of ICBMs and thus vitiate the peace
through mutually assured destruction that has prevailed for more than half a
century.103 These threats are at least as serious today as the stationing of
nuclear weapons in space was in 1967, and updating the Treaty to deal with
them is the only way to fulfill the spirit of the Treaty in the 21st century.
IV.

THE OUTER SPACE TREATY SHOULD BE AMENDED IN A TARGETED
MANNER

The current Outer Space Treaty is dangerously outdated, but so far all
proposals to update the legal regime for space weaponry have fallen on deaf
ears. The 2002 joint proposal by China and Russia was too blunt an
instrument and was completely ignored by the United States. Instead of
simply banning all space weapons in a new treaty, Article IV of the original
Outer Space Treaty should be updated to include certain types of kinetic kill
vehicles, laser weapons, and ASATs, in addition to the weapons of mass
destruction that it already expressly bans. This is likely to be a more
palatable option for the United States, which will still be able to pursue other
military uses of space essential to its national security.
A.

International Law Has the Potential to Stabilize Space as It Has
Stabilized Other Areas of International Relations

International law has served the world well in a number of important
contexts, most notably at sea104 and in the general field of arms control.105
Wherever international law is applied successfully, relative anarchy turns
into relative peace and security;106 just as all individuals benefit from the
rule of law in a given nation, all nations benefit from the rule of law in the
international context. Now, in the 21st century, these lessons must be
applied to space.
The development of space law is analogous to the growth of the law
of the sea from the Mare Clausum ideas of the 17th century, through the
103
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“freedom of the seas” of the 19th century, to the 1982 UNCLOS III treaty.107
Mare Clausum, or “closed seas,” involved the idea that each country had the
right to claim as much of the ocean for itself as it could—the more powerful
the navy, the wider the sovereignty.108 This worked reasonably well for 200
years, but with the coming of the industrial revolution, the dominant sea
power—Great Britain—found that its interests would be much better served
by “freedom of the seas.”109 Britain would be better off if it could sail the
globe unhindered by the territorial claims of other nations, even if this meant
that it had to give up its own territorial claims to parts of the oceans where it
had the ability to exert control by brute force.110 Britain was still the
dominant sea power for another century after “freedom of the seas”
supplanted Mare Clausum, and even though it did have to give up its claims
to actual sovereignty at sea, its navy was as strong as ever and it prospered
greatly during this period.111 Eventually, however, “freedom of the seas”
itself became obsolete and unmanageable as more and more nations began to
assert themselves at sea and interfere, directly or indirectly, with the freedom
of other nations.112 The solution was international law, as embodied in the
UNCLOS III treaty.113
Like Britain in the 19th century with respect to the oceans, the United
States in the 21st century sees the idea of “freedom” as the perfect legal
regime for space. No country “owns” space—there is no Mare Clausum in
space—but every country has the right to use its power however it sees fit in
order to exploit its interests there. In every conventional sense, the United
States is the dominant world power of the early 21st century. But
unfortunately, as was demonstrated on September 11, 2001, conventional
power does not guarantee security in today’s world. This vulnerability is
even more apparent in space. While the United States is indeed capable of
unilaterally extending its military presence into space via the deployment of
satellite-based weapons, these multi-billion dollar devices are inherently
vulnerable to attack from relatively cheap and unsophisticated ASATs based
on Earth. A determined enemy would be able to cripple any potential United
States space weapon systems, and an ability to cripple satellite-based
weapons implies an ability to cripple any other satellites—including military
reconnaissance satellites currently in use by the United States. Before
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opening this Pandora’s box of satellite-based weapons, the United States
should consider the downsides of discarding the “gentleman’s agreement”
against space weaponization that has prevailed for decades.114
Instead, the United States should advocate adopting a UNCLOS IIItype treaty for space that would provide a detailed legal regime protecting
the interests of all nations in space.115 Even though this would circumscribe
the United States’ freedom of action in space by, inter alia, putting strict
limits on the weaponization of space, the United States would be better
served overall. Its other satellite systems (including non-weaponized
military support satellites) would be protected by limits on ASATs, and it
would not have to bear the expense and insecurity inherent in an arms race
in space. Just as “freedom of the seas” became obsolete in the 20th century
when states saw that unilateral exertions of power to protect their interests at
sea caused unnecessary expense and insecurity, “freedom of space” is an
obsolete concept that should be reigned in by international law. All
nations—and humanity at large—will be better off.
Unfortunately, under the Bush administration, the United States seems
firmly committed to “freedom of space”—it sees no need to consider other
possibilities.116 For the last several years, the United States has pursued
space weapons technology in the face of opposition from the rest of the
world.117 The justifications for these space weapons programs usually come
back to national security, but commercial interests in space for the United
States and its citizens are also implicated.118 As with other aspects of United
States foreign policy in the last several years, the American position on
space weapons has been characterized by a distinct unwillingness to
compromise with other nations. In a major speech to the Conference on
Disarmament, the U.S. representative stated that “the commitment of the
United States to the exploration and use of outer space by all nations, for
peaceful purposes and for the benefit of humanity, is clear. But the peaceful
exploration and use of space obviously does not rule out activities in pursuit
of national security goals.”119 The United States sets its national security
goals, and pursues them unilaterally—it has so far been unwilling to
consider all of the manifold international ramifications of its policies. The
space weapons debate has been simmering since the 1970s, but only since
114
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the early 21st century has it reached crisis proportions—not only because of
rapidly advancing technology, but also because of American domestic
politics.120
B.

The UNCLOS III Treaty Is an Excellent Recent Example of the Power
of International Law to Stabilize Relations Among Nations

The 1982 UNCLOS III Treaty revolutionized ocean law, and now that
space is becoming more and more heavily used, it is time to consider
revolutionizing space law as well. However, the UNCLOS III Treaty is
extraordinarily lengthy and detailed—it took several years to fully draft.121
The issues in space are not nearly as complex and varied as the maritime law
issues covered in UNCLOS III. In fact, if Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty is simply updated to deal with kinetic kill vehicles, lasers, and
ASATs, that will be enough to have a comparable effect on peace and
stability in space.
The preamble to the UNCLOS III Treaty is remarkably similar to that
of the Outer Space Treaty. It begins by affirming that “the States Parties to
this Convention . . . [are] aware of the historic significance of this
Convention as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice
and progress for all peoples of the world.”122 This is the same type of
magnanimous language found in the preamble to the Outer Space Treaty,
and shows that noble humanitarian principles are at the heart of both treaties.
The UNCLOS III preamble goes on to say that the parties believe:
[T]hat the codification and progressive development of the law
of the sea achieved in this Convention will contribute to the
strengthening of peace, security, cooperation and friendly
relations among all nations in conformity with the principles of
justice and equal rights and will promote the economic and
social advancement of all peoples of the world, in accordance
with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set
forth in the Charter.123
This again shows the similarity between the noble principles of the
UNCLOS III Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty. Both treaties are designed
to harmonize the interactions of diverse parties in vast open areas that are
owned by no one.
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Even though the UNCLOS III Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty
share the same noble goals, the UNCLOS III Treaty is far ahead of the Outer
Space Treaty in its level of detail. For one thing, the UNCLOS III Treaty is
over 200 pages long, while the Outer Space Treaty is less than ten pages
long.124 This is understandable to some extent—because humans have
obviously been exploring the seas much longer than they have been
exploring space, more rules need to be written in order to cover the more
varied interactions that go on at sea. UNCLOS III also took many years to
put together and implement. The problems facing the international
community in space are simpler, but more pressing, and should therefore be
dealt with in a more straightforward and faster way.
It is unlikely that a treaty on the scale of UNCLOS III will be needed
for space any time soon. But some of the fundamental principles of
UNCLOS III can and should be adapted to the space context and
incorporated into the Outer Space Treaty. Specifically, the “freedom of
space” idea that largely prevails under current international law should be
reigned in to some extent, in the same manner that “freedom of the seas” has
been reigned in by UNCLOS III.125 At a general level, this is the way to deal
with the most pressing issues in space—namely, the impending deployment
of kinetic kill vehicles and lasers, and the continued development and testing
of ASATs.
C.

While UNCLOS III Is a Good Example to Follow on a General Level,
an Amended Outer Space Treaty Should in Its Details Resemble the
Arms Control Treaties of the Cold War

The arms control treaties of the Cold War between the United States
and the Soviet Union—particularly the ABM Treaty126 and the Interim
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms (“SALT Treaties”)127—were instrumental in
reducing tensions and mitigating the scale of the continuous arms race
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between the two superpowers.128 Today, the United States, China, and
Russia should look to this past experience as a guide to the potential benefits
of constructively updating the Outer Space Treaty. The United States and
China are at a crossroads—they can either throw themselves into a
destabilizing arms race involving space-based weapons and ASATs, or they
can come to the table and rethink the aging Outer Space Treaty. The
consequences of the former could be catastrophic, but they will in any case
be very expensive. The latter option, however, would lead to increased
stability and understanding between the two nations and to a better, more
peaceful world.
The ABM Treaty, which was in effect from 1972 to 2002, serves as an
excellent model for what should be done with the Outer Space Treaty. The
ABM Treaty provides a very detailed description of the types of weapons it
is designed to affect:
For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to
counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight
trajectory, currently consisting of:
(a) ABM interceptor
missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and
deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;
(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and
deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and (c) ABM
radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM
role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.129
This is exactly the sort of detailed weapons definition that should be done
for the Outer Space Treaty. Both sides should agree on specific definitions
of kinetic kill vehicles, space-based laser systems, and ASATs, and spell out
those definitions in the text of an updated Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty. The ABM Treaty lasted from 1972 to the end of the Cold War, and
then for another decade.130 Without it, both the United States and the Soviet
Union would have been forced into a destabilizing and expensive arms race
that could have had tragic consequences.
The fact that the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty after
thirty years of adherence does not detract from the enormous benefits
gleaned by all sides during the time the treaty was in force. The ABM
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Treaty was ideally suited to the Cold War, and even though it was
superceded by events during the decade following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it served its original purpose well.131 The United States and China
should look to the ABM Treaty as a shining example of the benefits of arms
control and amend the Outer Space Treaty in accordance with that example.
The principles behind other Cold War arms control treaties are also
highly relevant to the current standoff between the United States and China
over space weapons. The SALT treaty recognizes in its preamble that
nuclear war would be disastrous for both sides and that limiting the weapons
that could take part in or instigate such a conflict is a good idea for both
sides.132 The Parties to the SALT II Treaty were “conscious that nuclear war
would have devastating consequences for all mankind” and “convinced that
the additional measures limiting strategic offensive arms provided for in this
Treaty will contribute to the improvement of relations between the Parties,
help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen
international peace and security.”133 These very same ideas militate in favor
of adopting amendments to the Outer Space Treaty that would ban
destabilizing kinetic kill vehicles, space-based lasers, and ASATs. With a
new geopolitical dynamic and rapidly advancing technology, the Cold War
limits on ICBMs and the current Outer Space Treaty’s ban solely of weapons
of mass destruction in space are no longer enough to protect the peace and
security of humanity in the 21st century.
D.

Specifically, Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty Should Be Amended
in a Targeted Manner to Address the Emerging Threats of Kinetic Kill
Vehicles, Space-Based Lasers, and ASATs

It will not take much to effectively update the Outer Space Treaty to
deal with emerging threats related to the development and deployment of
space weapons and ASATs. As discussed above,134 the relevant portion of
Article IV of the Treaty currently reads “States Parties to the Treaty
undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear
weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such
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weapons on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner.”135 It should be updated to read:
States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit
around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons, any
other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, kinetic kill
vehicles, or directed energy weapons, install such weapons on
celestial bodies, station such weapons in outer space in any
other manner, or attack objects in outer space with weapons
based on Earth.
Put simply, Article IV of the Treaty must be updated to ban not only
weapons of mass destruction—as it currently does—but also kinetic kill
vehicles, space-based laser weapons, and ASATs.
These simple changes would make a world of difference, and could
prevent catastrophe. In any case, they will save all sides the enormous
trouble and expense that would be involved in a full-fledged arms race in
space. Eventually the legal regime in space will need a more complete
overhaul along the lines of UNCLOS III—by the 22nd century, humanity’s
use of space could easily be as common and complex as its use of the oceans
is today—but in the near to mid-term, amending Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty in the manner described would be enough to avert the worst
dangers. In any case, as discussed below,136 it is the option with the most
realistic chance for success.
If the United States continues to refuse to negotiate an extension to the
Outer Space Treaty, the geopolitical standoff with China will become more
and more severe as the 21st century progresses. China’s bold test of an
ASAT in January 2007 demonstrates that it is not cowed by the current U.S.
technological superiority in space, and that it is able and willing to continue
developing its own weapons. It will have no incentive to slow down or halt
development of these weapons until the United States comes to the
negotiating table to discuss limiting its own weapons.137 While it might be
possible for both sides to reach a sort of de facto agreement on limiting
space weapons, a written document—specifically the proposed amendment
to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty—is preferable because it will
provide more certainty, and therefore more security overall.138
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Because This Proposed Amendment Meets the Needs of All Sides, the
United States and China Are Likely to Agree to It

Ultimately, this simple proposed amendment to Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty is likely to be accepted by both the United States and China.
The critical thing for the United States is that such a change will not hamper
its ability to effectively develop and deploy the types of military support
satellites that it currently uses and plans to use in the future.139 For China,
such a change to the Outer Space Treaty would have almost the same effect
on its security as the ban on “all types of weapons” that it is currently
proposing140—all major offensive space weapons would be banned.
The United States has recently reaffirmed its unequivocal support for
the current Outer Space Treaty.141 Eric M. Javits proclaimed—in reference
to arms control treaties affecting space—that “most important . . . is the
Outer Space Treaty, to which the United States remains firmly
committed.”142 In order to appear firmly committed to international law in
space, the United States continues to make statements such as this, where it
reaffirms its complete commitment to past treaties.143 The problem,
however, is that space weapons technology is advancing rapidly, and a firm
commitment to uphold the letter of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty is not
enough to uphold the spirit of the treaty in the 21st century. Throughout his
speech, Mr. Javits references the bold principles set forth in the preamble to
Outer Space Treaty, discussed extensively above,144 and reaffirms
unequivocal support for those principles.145 If such proclamations are true,
the United States ought to be willing to sit down and discuss modest
extensions to the Treaty in order to allow it to keep up with the times. A
simple proposal to extend Article IV of the Treaty in the very targeted
manner advocated here could very well meet with a receptive response.
Some conservatives in the United States have argued strongly for the
further development of space weapons.146 They claim that “a powerful and
influential United States is good for world peace, stability, and enforcing the
rule of law internationally,”147 and that therefore American space weapons
139
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development will actually serve to increase global stability, rather than
decrease it.148 This argument seems to assume that the United States is so
much more powerful than all other nations that it does not really need to
worry about how they will react to a space weapons deployment—if China
and Russia resent American military action in space, they will need to keep
their opinions to themselves due to fear of overwhelming American military
superiority. However, as has been discussed above,149 the deployment of
space weapons will not provide this sought-after military superiority—
ASATs will still pose a serious threat to the much more complicated and
expensive space weapons being considered for deployment. Moreover,
China, Russia, and others are unlikely to submit so easily to American
power, no matter how advanced the available weaponry.150
International law is the better solution. As has been demonstrated by
numerous successful arms control treaties in the past—the original Outer
Space Treaty, the SALT treaty, and the ABM Treaty for three decades—
international law, while not perfect by any means, can often be successful in
averting destabilizing arms races. The United States must of course remain
somewhat cautious—it should not entirely dismantle its research and
development of future space weapons—but at the same time it should not
cynically refuse all negotiation simply because of the potential for its
strategic adversaries to act in bad faith.
China and Russia have been pushing very hard in recent years for
negotiations on the space weapons issue, and they have given the United
States no reason to doubt their sincerity. The 2002 working paper jointly
submitted by the two countries to the Conference on Disarmament called
“not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying any kinds of
weapons, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies, or not to station
such weapons in outer space in any other manner” and “not to resort to the
threat or use of force against outer space objects.”151 This language was too
broad and sweeping, because instead of proposing to ban only the specific
types of offensive weapons currently being planned for deployment in the
next few decades—kinetic kill vehicles and lasers—it simply proposes to
ban “all types of weapons.” China and Russia almost certainly understood
that such a comprehensive ban on all space weapons would be unacceptable
to the United States, which has already invested heavily in various types of
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military support satellites152 that could arguably fall within such a broad
prohibition. China and Russia mainly want to avoid the major impending
threats posed by kinetic kill vehicles and space-based lasers—they are not
nearly as concerned about U.S. military support satellites.153 It is therefore
very likely that this general language was intended only to be a starting point
for negotiations, and not by any means the “final offer” from the two
countries.
A ban on “all types of weapons” is a complete non-starter to the
United States because it has already invested significantly in various military
support satellites that could technically fall within that language, and it
would be unwilling to turn back the clock in favor of its potential
adversaries. But banning only kinetic kill vehicles and space-based laser
weapons (and ASATs) through the amendment to Article IV of the Outer
Space Treaty proposed above would be a very different matter. If the
language in the amended treaty is made sufficiently clear so that only these
weapons, and not any other types of satellites, are banned, the United States
is much more likely to at least come to the table and discuss amending the
Treaty. Also, a simple amendment to Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty—
which has been in effect since 1967 and has never been the subject of
significant controversy in the interim—might be easier to swallow than an
entirely new treaty. On a visceral level, the idea of adopting a new treaty
based on the China-Russia joint paper might be unpalatable to the United
States in a way that amending the current treaty would not be. The Outer
Space Treaty must simply be updated to keep pace with changing
technology—an eminently reasonable proposition.
The actual implementation of this proposed amendment to Article IV
of the Outer Space Treaty would be relatively straightforward. A ban on
actual space weapons—kinetic kill vehicles and lasers—would be easy to
implement since these weapons have yet to be deployed at all. A ban on the
use of ASATs would be a bit more difficult because these weapons are
already operational. However, both sides realize that ASATs are extremely
destabilizing from a strategic point of view. Additionally, since ASATs
threaten all satellites—not just actual space weapons—they have the
potential to disrupt all sorts of vital infrastructure. Banning them would be
to everyone’s benefit, and would be no more difficult to implement than the
reductions in ICBM inventory required under SALT. If the international
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community can muster the will to amend Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, the implementation of that amendment will be reasonably painless.
V.

CONCLUSION

The space weapons currently under development are extremely
complex and extremely expensive devices. They are inherently vulnerable
to asymmetrical attacks by much cheaper and less complex ASATs, and the
strategic interplay between them, ASATs, and ICBMs will greatly increase
geopolitical instability between the United States and China. Space weapons
are also sure to inflame Russia and others and drive them into the welcoming
arms of China. The long-term consequences for the United States of a lack
of law in this area could be quite serious—China, at least, is likely to reach
economic parity with the United States later in the century, and by that time
it will have its own offensive space weapons capability.
The solution to this problem is to update Article IV of the 1967 Outer
Space Treaty to cover these new offensive space weapons. As long as it is
made perfectly clear in the treaty language that the changes affect only these
new weapons—kinetic kill vehicles, lasers, and ASATs—and not any other
sorts of military satellites being used by the United States, the United States
would have good reason to come to the table and negotiate such an
amendment. China and Russia have been pushing for such negotiations for a
long time, but their insistence thus far on broad, sweeping treaty language—
and, in fact, an entirely new treaty, as opposed to a simple amendment to the
Outer Space Treaty—has kept the United States from even beginning
negotiations. A compromise is in order.

